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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
          Silas Taylor, Jr., appeals from a final judgment 
entered on November 29, 1995.  In his complaint he sought a 
judgment declaring that the actions of the appellee, Housing 
Authority of Bayonne, New Jersey, in terminating his tenancy and 
seeking his eviction in a proceeding in the New Jersey Superior 
Court, predicated on his convictions on pleas of guilty in a New 
Jersey municipal court to possession of drug paraphernalia on the 
authority's premises, violated certain of his constitutional 
rights.  While Taylor originally also sought relief against the 
secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the issues relating to the secretary are not 
involved on this appeal and the secretary is no longer a party to 
the case.  The State of New Jersey has intervened pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2403(b) supporting the position of the Housing 
Authority.  This appeal raises the question of whether the 
Housing Authority is barred from seeking Taylor's eviction by 
reason of his punishment for the possession of the drug 
paraphernalia in the municipal court by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 
               I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
          The district court set forth the background of the case 
in its opinion reported as Taylor v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314 
(D.N.J. 1995).  Since 1988 Taylor has resided in an apartment in 
low-income housing in Bayonne, New Jersey, owned and operated by 
the Housing Authority.  The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development subsidizes his rent so that he pays only $125 per 
month for an apartment with a fair monthly rental value of $706.  
Taylor is both hearing and speech impaired and his sole income is 
a monthly social security disability payment of $497.  
Consequently, he cannot afford to pay market rent and if evicted 
from the Bayonne apartment will have no place to live and will 
end up on the streets homeless. 
          On October 20, 1992, Taylor pleaded guilty to 
possession of narcotics paraphernalia in the Bayonne Municipal 
Court, a violation of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:35-1 et seq. (West 1995).  Taylor committed 
this offense on the property of the Housing Authority in which he 
resides, though not in his particular apartment.  On February 3, 
1994, Taylor again pleaded guilty to the commission of the same 
offense, though he committed this second offense on a different 
day and on property next to that of the Housing Authority rather 
than on its property.  The Housing Authority and the State do not 
contend either that Taylor possessed drugs on the Housing 
Authority property or that he distributed drugs.  The municipal 
court sentenced Taylor to 30 days imprisonment and fined him $625 
on the second conviction.  While the parties do not specify the 
exact sentence imposed on the first conviction, they agree that 
it was similar to that imposed on the second conviction. 
          New Jersey is quite protective of tenants in 
residential units and has adopted an Anti-Eviction Act, 
applicable to both public and private housing, delineating the 
circumstances in which a tenant can be removed from a rental 
unit.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1996).  One such 
circumstance is where the tenant has been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to an offense under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 
1987, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-1 et seq., involving possession of 
drug paraphernalia "within or upon the leased premises or the 
building or complex of buildings and land appurtenant thereto . . 
. in which those premises are located."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18- 
61.1n (subsection "61.1n").  The parties agree that Taylor 
pleaded guilty to an offense within the foregoing category.  
Thus, without question, the Housing Authority may evict Taylor 
under the Anti-Eviction Act if the New Jersey courts apply the 
act as it is written.   
          Pursuant to the Anti-Eviction Act, on November 29, 
1994, the Housing Authority served notice on Taylor that it was 
requiring his removal from its premises.  Taylor responded by 
filing this action in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
charging that his eviction would violate his rights under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because he previously had been sentenced 
in the municipal court for possession of the drug paraphernalia 
and that his eviction would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.  While he also claimed that his eviction 
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
he does not raise that contention on this appeal.  The Housing 
Authority then instituted a summary dispossession proceeding in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Law Division, 
Special Civil Part, against Taylor seeking his eviction.  The 
state court, however, on Taylor's motion, has stayed those 
proceedings pending the disposition of this case in the federal 
courts.  As we have indicated, the State of New Jersey has 
intervened on behalf of the Housing Authority.   
          Inasmuch as the facts germane to this case are not in 
dispute, the district court decided the case on cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  Initially the court pointed out that the 
parties disagreed as to whether it should consider the 
constitutional questions as a facial challenge, or on an "as 
applied" basis, i.e., consider "the specific circumstances of 
Taylor's convictions and economic misfortune."  Taylor, 913 F. 
Supp. at 318.  The court concluded that inasmuch as the New 
Jersey state courts had not applied the facts to the 
circumstances of this case "it [was] inappropriate, from a 
prudential and jurisdictional perspective, to consider this an 
'as applied' challenge."  Id.  Thus, the court treated the case 
as a facial challenge to the Anti-Eviction Act.  Id. 
          The court then stated that "[s]tate action violates 
neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Excessive Fines Clause 
unless it constitutes punishment."  Id. at 319.  Thus, the court 
considered whether proceedings under subsection 61.1n are 
intended to punish the tenant.  The court said that the label put 
on a proceeding does not determine if it is civil or criminal, 
i.e., remedial or punitive, and that the court must "undertake 'a 
particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes 
that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.'"  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901 
(1989)).  The court then cited Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 
602, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993), for the proposition "that for a 
measure to qualify as punishment, it need not serve solely 
retributive or deterrent purposes; rather, unless a sanction is 
solely remedial, it is punishment."  Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 320. 
          The court indicated that Taylor advanced the aspect of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause involving the protection "against 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  Id. at 321.  The 
court said that proceedings under subsection 61.1n were not 
intended to be punitive.  In this regard, it pointed out that the 
eviction of "an insidious tenant is a rational and effective 
means of protecting all other tenants from activity antithetical 
to their health, safety and welfare."  Id.  The court also noted 
that because the legislature placed subsection 61.1n in remedial 
legislation, the Anti-Eviction Act, and because the act applies 
to both public and private landlords, subsection 61.1n is 
remedial.  Id. at 321-22.  The court held that proceedings under 
subsection 61.1n would not be punitive merely because of their 
impact on Taylor.   
          The court also held that the Excessive Fines Clause 
could not apply because the proceedings under subsection 61.1n 
were not punitive.  The court then rejected the Due Process 
Clause argument on the same basis. 
          As a result of its conclusions, the district court 
entered the judgment in favor of the appellees from which Taylor 
appeals.  We exercise plenary review on this appeal. 
 
 
                          II. DISCUSSION 
 
                   a. The parties' contentions 
 
          Taylor argues that the district court erred in treating 
the action as a facial attack on subsection 61.1n.  He points out 
that the Anti-Eviction Act upon its adoption in 1974 
"'dramatically changed the rights of landlords and owners by 
prohibiting the ejectment of residential tenants or lessees 
simply because their tenancies or leases had expired.'"  Br. at 8 
(quoting Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 638 A.2d 1301, 1306 
(N.J. 1994)).  He indicates that in 1990 the legislature added 
subsection 61.1n to the Anti-Eviction Act and he then 
forthrightly acknowledges that "based on [his] February, 1994, 
municipal court conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, 
and under [subsection 61.1n, he] is subject to eviction from his 
apartment."  Br. at 8. 
          Taylor next explains that he does not challenge the 
constitutionality of subsection 61.1n in general, but rather 
argues that his eviction would violate the Double Jeopardy and 
Excessive Fines Clauses.  Distinguishing between facial and as 
applied challenges, he contends that this case involves an as 
applied challenge because there is a difference between 
situations in which a party claims that a statute in all its 
applications is unconstitutional and cases in which a party 
acknowledges that a statute might be applied constitutionally in 
some circumstances but is unconstitutional as applied to that 
party.  He cites United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 
S.Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982); 
and Jacobs v. The Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 905-06 (11th Cir. 
1995), to illustrate the distinction between facial and as 
applied challenges. 
          Taylor "readily concedes that he could not succeed in a 
facial challenge to the statute."  Br. at 11.  He then explains 
that: 
          there are undoubtedly many situations where a 
          tenant could legitimately be evicted for drug 
          related activities without offending the 
          Constitution - using the apartment to deal 
          drugs, for example.  But more importantly, 
          the very nature of the plaintiff's challenge 
          implicates consideration of individual 
          circumstances.  A fine cannot be 'excessive' 
          or an eviction 'punitive' absent an analysis 
          of the unique circumstances in which the 
          individual reposes.  Thus, the Constitutional 
          violations complained of are simply not 
          susceptible to facial attack. 
 
Id. at 11.  Taylor then continues that while "it may be 
inappropriate to consider an 'as-applied' challenge to a statute 
where there is ambiguity in the statute itself or where it is 
unclear that the statute applies to plaintiff's conduct, such is 
not the case here."  Id. at 12.  Rather, Taylor acknowledges that 
subsection 61.1n as written provides for his eviction. 
          Taylor argues that application of subsection 61.1n to 
him would constitute punishment because, notwithstanding the 
remedial character of an eviction, an eviction also has a 
"retributive function."  Br. at 18.  He claims that an eviction 
constitutes a forfeiture, citing, inter alia, A.P. Dev. Corp. v. 
Band, 550 A.2d 1220, 1228 (N.J. 1988), and Carteret Properties v. 
Variety Donuts, Inc., 228 A.2d 674, 680 (N.J. 1967).  His 
eviction, he says, should be regarded as an excessive fine 
because his offenses, which he does not seek "to minimize," 
nevertheless were "minor in nature."  Br. at 23.  Furthermore, he 
points out that he did not commit an offense in his apartment.  
He also notes that he is receiving a rental subsidy of $581 per 
month or $6,972 per year, based on the difference between the 
fair market rental value of his apartment, $706 per month, and 
his rent of $125.  He argues that he could remain in the 
apartment for ten years or 20 years so that his eviction could 
cause him a loss of more than $100,000 in subsidies. 
          He then argues that his eviction would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because he was punished in the Bayonne 
Municipal Court for his drug paraphernalia offenses.  He 
emphasizes that the municipal court prosecutions were in the name 
of the State of New Jersey and that the Housing Authority should 
be regarded as a state agency.  He contends that his eviction 
would not serve a remedial purpose, and even if it did, it should 
be regarded as a punishment for double jeopardy purposes because 
it is a remedy disproportionate to his conduct. 
          The State of New Jersey in its original brief argues 
that the district court properly considered Taylor's challenge to 
subsection 61.1n on a facial basis because, notwithstanding his 
contention that he was seeking relief only for himself, "the 
decision in this matter would affect all tenants who are subject 
to" subsection 61.1n.  Br. at 9.  On the merits, the State 
contends that the Anti-Eviction Act is intended to protect 
tenants and that subsection 61.1n furthers this remedial purpose 
"by eliminating drug activity from the buildings in which they 
reside and areas surrounding those buildings."  Id. at 13.  Thus, 
subsection 61.1n was intended to protect tenants from people 
exactly like Taylor.  Id. 
          The State in its original brief cites our opinion in 
Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), as the 
then most recent authoritative precedent defining what 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy, ex post facto, and 
due process purposes.  It points out that under Artway a measure 
must pass three tests so as not to constitute punishment:  its 
actual or subjective purpose must not be to punish; its objective 
purpose must not be punitive; and its effects must not amount to 
punishment.  It argues that subsection 61.1n passes all three 
tests, and thus a proceeding under it does not constitute 
punishment.  Consequently, in the State's view subsection 61.1n 
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and, by a similar 
analysis, cannot violate the Excessive Fines Clause.   
          The State modified its position after the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996), which we 
discuss below, after the State filed its brief.  In a letter 
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), the State argues that Urseryhas 
undermined Artway and thus Artway should not be applied in 
this case.  The State argues that we should affirm because, under 
Ursery, Taylor is not being punished by the eviction proceedings 
for either double jeopardy or excessive fines purposes.  The 
Housing Authority joins in the position of the State. 
 
 
                        b. Our disposition 
          As we have explained, the parties dispute whether the 
district court properly considered the case on a facial as 
opposed to an as applied basis.  While Taylor advances the as 
applied argument primarily in connection with his excessive fines 
claim, he also raises it with respect to his double jeopardy 
argument.  We, however, will not linger on the distinction 
between a facial and an as applied challenge because we find that 
subsection 61.1n is constitutional as applied to Taylor. 
          In three recent cases the Supreme Court and this court 
have had occasion to consider double jeopardy and excessive fines 
issues.  First, in Artway we considered a challenge to the 
registration provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law which require 
that certain sex offenders register with law enforcement 
authorities upon completion of their sentences.  Artway involved 
double jeopardy, ex post facto, and bill of attainder challenges 
to the law but did not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.  We 
found in Artway that the "threshold question under each clause 
[was] whether the registration provisions of Megan's Law impose 
'punishment.'  If registration does not impose punishment, our 
inquiry with respect to the registration issue is at an end."  
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1253.  After a comprehensive analysis of 
numerous precedents, in Artway "we develop[ed] a multi-part test 
that looks to the legislature's subjective purpose in enacting 
the challenged measure, its 'objective' purpose in terms of 
proportionality and history, and the measure's effects."  Artway, 
81 F.3d at 1254.   
          Under the first Artway test, a law will provide for 
punishment if the legislature's subjective intention is that it 
punish.  Id. at 1263.  The second Artway test is an objective 
purpose analysis which asks whether, regardless of the 
legislature's intent in enacting the law, the law has an 
objective purpose to punish.  Id.  The objective purpose analysis 
has three parts:  first, can the law be explained solely by a 
remedial purpose; if not it is punishment.  Second, if the law's 
objective purpose is remedial does an historical analysis show 
that the measure traditionally has been regarded as punishment; 
if so then the measure will be punishment unless its text or 
legislative history demonstrates that the measure is not 
punishment.  The third component of the objective purpose 
analysis considers both the measure's "deterrent and salutary 
purposes."  Id. at 1263. 
          In Artway we also held that even if a measure passes 
the subjective and objective purpose tests, if the effects of the 
measure are sufficiently severe, then regardless of how they are 
justified, the measure must be considered punishment.  Id. at 
1263.  The effects test, however, is difficult to apply because 
the cases do not establish a clearly defined line distinguishing 
between measures that are or are not punishment.  Id. at 1266.  
Thus, in Artway we pointed out that while imprisonment and 
revocation of citizenship constitute punishment, loss of a 
profession, a right to work, or the termination of social 
security benefits do not.  Id. at 1266.  Yet we do not doubt that 
the person against whom the remedy in the latter three situations 
is applied feels that he or she has been punished.   
          Within a few weeks of our opinion in Artway we decided 
United States v. Various Computers, 82 F.3d 582 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 406 (1996).  In Various Computers the claimant 
in a civil forfeiture proceeding had pleaded guilty to a charge 
of unauthorized use of and possession of credit cards.  The 
government then instituted a civil in rem forfeiture against the 
property the claimant had acquired by the crime even though the 
court had ordered the claimant to make restitution to the store 
where he acquired the property.  We rejected the claimant's 
double jeopardy and excessive fine arguments because we held that 
the forfeiture of the property was not punishment even though in 
a sense the claimant already was paying for the property through 
making restitution.  Id. at 589.  Because the property was the 
fruit of the crime, the claimant "had no legal rights of 
ownership" over the property.  Id. at 589. 
          Finally, in United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 
(1996), the Supreme Court held that the civil forfeitures 
involved in that case and civil forfeitures generally, "do not 
constitute 'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Claim."  Id. at 2138.  Ursery is particularly significant because 
it drew a sharp distinction between civil penalties and civil 
forfeitures.  The Court discussed United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, a case on which Taylor relies.  In 
Halper the Court found that a treble damages action under the 
False Claims Act against a person already criminally convicted 
for the conduct was punitive and therefore was barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Court distinguished Halper from the 
situations before it in Ursery as Ursery involved civil 
forfeitures rather than civil penalties.  Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 
2144.  The Court explained that it "is difficult to see how the 
rule of Halper could be applied to a civil forfeiture."  Id. at 
2145.  In a passage, significant for our purposes in view of 
Taylor's emphasis of the value of the subsidized lease that he 
would lose in an eviction, the Court in Ursery said that, unlike 
in civil penalty cases, "for Double Jeopardy purposes we have 
never balanced the value of property forfeited in a particular 
case against the harm suffered by the Government in that case."  
Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2145. 
          Artway, Various Computers, and Ursery as well as Austin 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, inform our 
result.  We analyze the case for double jeopardy purposes both 
under Artway and Ursery, making the Artway analysis first.  We 
then resolve the excessive fine issue by following Austin and 
Various Computers.  In Artway we "attempted to harmonize a body 
of doctrine that has caused much disagreement in the federal and 
state courts.  We realize[d], however, that our synthesis is by 
no means perfect.  Only the Supreme Court knows where all the 
pieces belong."  Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.  This continues to be 
true and we do not attempt here to refine the synthesis in 
Artway.  Instead, we determine whether the application of 
subsection 61.1n in this case violates the Double Jeopardy and 
Excessive Fines Clauses and we say with some degree of confidence 
that it does not.   
          Our analysis requires us to review the Anti-Eviction 
Act.  The Act provides that for certain residential properties a 
tenant may be removed only for "good cause."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1996).  Good cause may be related to 
conduct of the tenant, e.g., the failure to pay rent, id. § 
2A:18-61.1a, or it may have nothing to do with the conduct of the 
tenant, e.g., the owner seeks to retire the building from 
residential use, id. § 2A:18-61.1h.  Subsection 61.1n relates to 
a tenant's activities, but it is nothing more than the 
legislature's recognition that it is unreasonable to deny a 
landlord the right to terminate a lease when its property is 
being used for purposes unlawful under the New Jersey 
Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987.  Yet subsection 61.1n does 
not require that the landlord bring an action to remove a tenant 
who violates the drug law.  Thus, subsection 61.1n leaves the 
decision on whether to remove a tenant to the judgment of the 
landlord which, after all, does have an interest in keeping its 
property free from criminal activity. 
          We do not doubt that if New Jersey did not have an 
Anti-Eviction Act so that landlord-tenant relationships were 
regulated solely by agreement, a landlord and tenant could agree 
in their lease for the removal of a tenant who violated the drug 
laws on the landlord's premises.  See Chase Manhattan Bank v. 
Josephson, 638 A.2d at 1306 ("At common law, the terms of the 
tenancy controlled the right of the owner or landlord to eject 
the tenant, whether that tenancy was a term of years or a 
periodic tenancy."); 25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 326 A.2d 
106, 110 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (before Anti-Eviction 
Act, common law governed the substantive terms of leases).  
Furthermore, we do not doubt that the landlord could use a 
tenant's conviction for violating the drug laws on its premises 
in an eviction proceeding as evidence to establish the tenant's 
violation of the lease.  State of New Jersey v. Gonzalez, 667 
A.2d 684, 690 (N.J. 1995).  In the circumstances, it would be 
far-fetched to hold that the legislature intended to punish a 
tenant violating the drug laws by the enactment of subsection 
61.1n.  To the contrary, inasmuch as the legislature authorized, 
but did not require, the landlord to bring removal proceedings 
under subsection 61.1n when the tenant was convicted of or 
pleaded guilty to an offense under the drug laws it did not 
intend to punish tenants by authorizing such proceedings.  
Rather, it merely permitted the landlord to protect its property 
from a tenant violating the law on the property.   
          In this regard we reiterate that the Anti-Eviction Act 
allows removal for causes wholly unrelated to the tenant's 
conduct.  Thus, a tenant may be removed because of the landlord's 
need to comply with applicable laws, to retire the property from 
residential use, to make reasonable changes in a lease at the 
lease's termination, to make certain types of conversions of the 
property, and for other reasons as well.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 
2A:18-61.1g, h, i, k.  The legislature did not intend to punish 
the tenants when it authorized such removals and it did not 
intend to punish them by authorizing their removal under the 
conditions set forth in subsection 61.1n either.  Consequently, 
subsection 61.1n passes the subjective Artway test. 
          Subsection 61.1n plainly passes Artway's objective 
test.  The subsection can be explained solely by the remedial 
purpose of allowing the landlord to remove a tenant who is using 
the landlord's premises for an unlawful purpose.  No landlord 
should have to suffer the use of its property for unlawful 
purposes.  Indeed, under both federal and New Jersey law a 
landlord in some circumstances runs the risk of its property 
being forfeited if it is aware of unlawful drug activity on its 
premises and does not take steps to end that activity.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:64-1, 5(b) (West 
1995).  Furthermore, it is in the interest of the other tenants 
that drug activities not be conducted on the premises.  Of 
course, removal of a tenant from a property traditionally has not 
been regarded as a punishment.  Thus, tenants have been removed 
for all sorts of reasons, e.g., someone else will pay more money 
for the lease, and, as we have indicated, tenants can be removed 
under the Anti-Eviction Act in circumstances that could not 
possibly be regarded as punitive.  Finally, subsection 61.1n 
passes the objective purpose analysis considering the measure's 
"deterrent and salutary" purposes. 
          As we set forth above, Artway indicated that severe 
effects can lead to a measure being regarded as a punishment.  
Taylor argues that the effects on him from being removed will be 
extremely severe and we believe that he argues that we should 
consider the case on an as applied basis for exactly that reason.  
As we also have indicated, we have taken into account his 
circumstances in deciding this matter.  Nevertheless, we find 
that they are not determinative.  We reiterate that the Supreme 
Court in Ursery stated that "for Double Jeopardy purposes we have 
never balanced the value of property forfeited in a particular 
case against the harm suffered by the Government in that case."  
Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2145.  Thus, we conclude that for double 
jeopardy purposes the loss of a lease should be regarded as a 
permissible effect.  This result is hardly surprising; if the 
termination of social security benefits, which can be critical to 
a disabled or elderly person, is not a punishment then why should 
the loss of a lease be a punishment?  See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367 (1960). 
          Up until this point in our opinion we have assumed the 
applicability of Artway.  That assumption, however, may not be 
correct.  Artway dealt with a registration law.  But, following 
Artway, we decided Various Computers and held that the civil 
forfeiture there was not punishment and thus was not precluded by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause notwithstanding the claimant's earlier 
prosecution for the offense which led to him acquiring possession 
of the property to be forfeited.  Then, in Ursery, the Supreme 
Court held that civil forfeitures generally do not constitute 
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Ursery, 
116 S.Ct. at 2138.  In Taylor's brief, which he filed before the 
Court filed its opinion in Ursery, he goes to great lengths to 
argue that a judgment of eviction against him would result in a 
forfeiture.  Furthermore, he points out that the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey has said that a "forfeiture is in the nature of a 
penalty."  Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Chapman, 171 A.2d 653, 660 
(N.J. 1960). 
          Yet, the Supreme Court of New Jersey's characterization 
of a forfeiture as a penalty is not controlling in a Fifth 
Amendment double jeopardy analysis.  For that analysis we look to 
the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States which 
court in Ursery indicated that a civil forfeiture is not 
punishment.  Thus, Taylor's characterization of the loss of his 
lease as a forfeiture is counterproductive.  Of course, if Urserycontrols 
this case, then since civil forfeitures categorically 
are excluded from being punishment, our Artway analysis is 
overinclusive.   
          Instead, under Ursery we need ask merely whether the 
legislature intended that eviction proceedings under subsection 
61.1n to be criminal or civil and whether the proceedings are so 
punitive in fact that they may not be viewed as civil regardless 
of the legislature's intent.  See Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2147.  
Clearly, an eviction is a civil proceeding, and, for the reasons 
we already have set forth and particularly for the historical 
reason that evictions are not punitive as they frequently are not 
dependent on a demonstration that the tenant was culpable, we 
conclude that an eviction should be viewed as civil in nature.  
Nevertheless, we do not decide whether the forfeiture involved 
here is governed by Ursery for double jeopardy purposes because, 
as we have explained, even under Artway Taylor's double jeopardy 
argument fails.  We recognize, however, that arguably Ursery is 
distinguishable from this case as it involved in rem forfeiture 
proceedings whereas the state eviction proceeding against Taylor 
is in personam.   
          We also note an inconsistency in Taylor's position 
which undermines his double jeopardy argument.  Taylor concedes 
that subsection 61.1n legitimately could be applied against a 
tenant using an apartment to deal drugs.  Yet one may wonder why 
it would follow that a drug dealer who had been prosecuted 
criminally and punished could be evicted under subsection 61.1n 
without the eviction constituting punishment under Taylor's 
analysis.  In other words, an eviction under subsection 61.1n 
either is or is not a punishment and the fact that the tenants 
being evicted are not equally culpable should not matter in a 
double jeopardy analysis. 
          Taylor argues that part of his punishment will be the 
loss of his rent subsidy.  It is not clear, however, whether the 
loss will result from the eviction or from his inability to 
obtain a subsidy for a different premises.  If his loss of the 
subsidy stems from an action of the federal government, i.e., the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, by reason of the 
dual sovereignty rule the loss may not be germane here to our 
double jeopardy analysis.  See United States v. Pungitore, 910 
F.2d 1084, 1105-07 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 915, 
111 S.Ct. 2009 (1991).  However, we do not rest our opinion on 
this point and for purposes of this appeal we treat his loss of 
subsidy as part of his claim that the eviction proceedings in the 
state court are punishing him. 
          In closing our discussion of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, we think it useful to state an overview of the case which 
we think demonstrates how inappropriate it would be to uphold 
Taylor's double jeopardy argument.  First, the eviction 
proceeding is completely independent of the criminal justice 
system, as the Housing Authority, not a prosecutor, is bringing 
the state proceedings.  Second, the Housing Authority is pursuing 
a traditional civil remedy which both public and private 
landlords seek.  Indeed, Taylor concedes that he could not have 
brought this action if his landlord had been a private party as 
the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses would not apply 
to such an entity.  Br. at 19.  Third, proceedings under 
subsection 61.1n, unlike the registration procedure in Artway, 
are not mandatory as the subsection does not require that a 
landlord seek to evict a tenant who is convicted of a drug 
violation.  Fourth, the landlord could require in its lease that 
the tenant not violate the drug laws on its premises and if the 
tenant violated the agreement the landlord could seek his 
eviction.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.1d and e.   
          Finally, one reasonably might ask why should a tenant 
benefit from conviction by using it as a shield against a 
landlord's attempt to protect its property and the other tenants?  
It would be strange, indeed, if the landlord could not seek to 
evict a tenant for drug activities because a prosecutor had 
brought criminal proceedings against the tenant for the 
activities.  Rather, one would suppose that the landlord could 
use the conviction as evidence to demonstrate that the tenant had 
violated the lease.  Indeed, as we pointed out above, a landlord 
who does not seek such eviction might run the risk of forfeiting 
his property to the state or federal government. 
          Finally, we reject Taylor's excessive fine argument.  
As the Supreme Court explained in Austin, a forfeiture can 
violate the Excessive Fines Clause only if the forfeiture was a 
punishment.  509 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2806.  The test for 
whether a civil in rem forfeiture constitutes punishment under 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is slightly 
different from the one employed in our double jeopardy clause 
analysis; thus, even though the state proceeding against Taylor 
is in personam, Taylor has less of a burden in meeting the 
Excessive Fines Clause standard. 
          In Austin, the Supreme Court held that a forfeiture 
would constitute punishment if it did not solely serve a remedial 
purpose, i.e., that it only can be explained as also serving in 
part to punish.  Id. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2806.  With this in 
mind, the Court undertook a two-part inquiry:  "Whether, at the 
time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, forfeiture was understood 
at least in part as punishment and whether forfeiture . . . 
should be so understood today."  Id. at 610-11, 113 S.Ct. at 
2806.  The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the Excessive 
Fines Clause, a "forfeiture generally and statutory in remforfeiture in 
particular historically have been understood, at 
least in part, as punishment."  Id. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 2810.  
The second prong of the Artway test incorporates the excessive 
fines clause inquiry under Austin. 
          Despite his lesser burden, Taylor has not proved that 
the forfeiture here constitutes punishment under the Excessive 
Fines Clause.  As we explained in our double jeopardy analysis 
under Artway, we find that the provisions of the Anti-Eviction 
Act and the legislative intent contradict any understanding of 
Taylor's forfeiture of his tenancy as punishment.  Accordingly, 
we cannot say that the forfeiture here served in part to punish.  





                         III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
          For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court entered on November 29, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
